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Kumar Ramohalli
General Backb, I'ound
The United States of America entered space with Explorer I, whose success was
ensured through highly reliable solid propellant rockets in the second, third, and fourth
stages; the use of clusters of identical motors (eleven, three, and one) is a characteristic
typical of solid motors, namely the ease of "mass production" after development. Solid
propellant rockets have been used extensively in space missions ranging from large boosters
to orbit-raising upper stages. The smaller motors find exclusive use in various earth-based
applications. The advantages of the solids include simplicity, readiness, volumetric
efficiency, and storabiiity (the advantages in specific comparison with liquid propellant
rockets are detailed elsewhere in this report). So long as we continue to use them, and
consider them for current and future missions, it is very important to maintain competence
in solid propellants. Without such "in-house" capability, costly and wasteful panic solutions
become necessary as problems are discovered in the use of newer propellants. Some non-
technical solutions have saved the day, but these are temporary solutions at best. These
aspects are listed in Fig. 1. Several recent advances in micro-technologies seem to indicate
that we may profitably use these developments to economically evolve improvements. Our
objectives are outlined in Fig. 2.
SO LONG AS WE CONTINUE TO USE THEM
• Important to maintain competence
• Avoid costly panic solutions
• Non-technical "solutions" may help in the short run,
but do harm eventually
IMPORTANT RECENT PROGRESS IN RELATED FIELDS
• Combustion
• Rheology
• Micro-Instrumentation/Diagnostics
• Chaos Theory
CAN BE APPLIED TO SOLID ROCKETS TO DERIVE
MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE AND AVOID WASTE
Fig. 1. Aspects of research on solid propellants.
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It may be surprising to learn that we do not seem to have a good understanding of the
fundamentals of solid propellants, especially after so many successful programs. The sheer
bulk of data from almost five decades of (composite) solid propellant rocketry would lead
one to suppose that very reliable rockets could be built based upon this data base. The fact
that things are not that easy is best summarized by Ed Price, who notes the following:
An enormous amount of money has been spent during development programs
on empirical approaches to meeting program needs for burning rate or
mechanical properties• The totality of such efforts contributes very little to
understanding or future ability for rational control because the myriad of
relevant material, formulation, and test conditions have little commonality
from one study to the next ....
• . . What they can't do by control of ingredient and processing specifications,
they fine tune by testing liquid strands during batch processing and adding
catalyst as needed. [His letter is reproduced in its entirety in Appendix D.]
With these clear revelations of the past and present status of solid propellants, one can
obtain a better feel for the facts. The advantages of solid propellants have made them so
desirable that a large number of these have been built and used without really
understanding them well. Instead of a scientific "ground-up" approach, most solid
propellant rockets have been built based upon past experience, educated guesses, and
extensive corrective procedures during the design evolution. To ensure a sufficiently good
understanding that results in verifiable quality and dependability, we will have to do better.
The rewards will be substantial.
In the specific context of the Space Transportation System (STS), or the shuttle, we can
realistically expect several important advances through a better understanding of solid
propellants. These are outlined in Fig. 3. Basically, the payload increases because the
liquid propellant margin can be reduced, the thrust vector control (TVC) system used to
balance out imbalances in the two boosters can be a lot lighter, and several other systems
can be made lighter. All these directly result in a lower cost per pound of material placed
in orbit. The indirect cost reductions are far more substantial. These come from decreased
developmental costs of the future motors.
Motivations
There are at least four important motivations for this scientific approach:
1. Long-term economy through quality, reliability, and sa/ety. There has been a
growing awareness in the rocketry community, and particularly at NASA, that a
thorough scientific understanding is the only way to achieve long-term
satisfactory performance and economy; this awareness was reflected in the
formation of Code Q at NASA.
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• PAYLOAD INCREASES BECAUSE
• Decreases in the liquid margin
• Decreases in the TVC system weight needed
for the two SRB mismatches
• Decreases in several other controls/instruments
-COST DECREASES BECAUSE
• ASRM and RSRM can be better designed
• HTPB can be used instead of PBAN
• Clean propellant can be quickly developed
• Insulation (non-asbestos) can be tailored
• Alternative propellants can be quickly implemented
• FUTURE NASA DIRECTIONS
• Can be easily followed
OF
Fig. 3. Advances derived from a better understanding of solid rockets.
2. New and Revised Designs. Many advanced designs (e.g., ASRM) and revised
designs (e.g., RSRM) are planned or are being executed. I Specific examples
include (1) the attempts to replace PBAN with HTPB in the STS SRBs and (2) the
alternative propellant being considered for pollution reduction through AN instead
of AP. Such new designs can be economically handled only through a better
understanding of the fundamentals. Safety, reliability, and quality cannot be
ensured if the general feeling is one of "Don't touch itt We just got it to work
with great difficulty. Don't alter anything."
3. Advanced Process Control. For safety reasons and also to introduce modern
computer-controlled processing, it is very important to understand the fundamental
relations among the process variables. It is simply not practical to introduce
advanced process control techniques if human monitoring and qualitative judgments
(based on experience) are constantly required. This specific aspect of autonomous
controls has become very important lately. With the recent NASA (and the USA)
thrusts toward space exploration and a permanent presence in space, it is easily
recognized that extraterrestrial propellant production is a major enabling
technology. This in situ propellant production must be demonstrated robotically.
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Some of the communication time lags between earth and other planets and asteroids
mandate an autonomous processing plant. Such autonomous propellant production
at remote sites can only be accomplished through a thorough understanding of the
process variables, contingency margins, and "beyond-the-envelope" knowledge.
This general area of autonomous propellant production using local resources
provides a strong motivation for a better understanding of the fundamentals.
High-Technology Devices. This decade has seen a rapid advance in several high
technologies. Microfiberoptics, IR/UV real-time imaging, free radical chemical
techniques, in situ non-obtrusive sensors, microchips, and microcircuitry provide
only a few examples of a wide variety of innovations. Many aspects of solid
propellant monitoring and control that were beyond the technologies of the 1970s
can be almost routinely handled through state=of-the=art technological advances.
These recent high-tech devices and the definite promise of imminent advances
provide an important motivation for revisiting many unsolved issues in solid
propellant rockets.
Technical Background
The technology of solid propellants and high explosives has developed into a maturing
art rather than a precise science. The variables and factors associated with typical
composite propellant processing are so many in number that they may elude traditional,
deterministic analyses. Quality control standards have been set based on known factors that
influence performance, but the unknowns continue to cause surprises. It is not uncommon
for propellants with "identical" ingredients processed in "identical" batches to reveal
perceptible, and frequently unacceptable, variations in burn rates and mechanical properties
(e.g., the tensile modulus). Two typical examples are shown in Figs. 4 and 5. Figure 4
shows a normalized burn rate, while the propellant in Fig. 5 indicates actual burn rates. It
is thought that, in both of these cases, the propellants were processed in very similar, if not
identical, manners. It is easy to recognize two aspects of this problem. One is the obvious
indication that the propellant may not meet the expected performance; the other is the more
important, genuine doubt about the performance of future batches. Of course, a major
factor that precludes conventional quality assurance analyses and reliability predictions is
the fact that usually, especially in larger motors, the number of batches will be too small for
a reasonable statistical analysis. Many of these anomalies in recent experiments have been
discussed. 2-6 It is clear that, for all the attention the problem has received, attempts at
analyses are rare.
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Quality control in solid propellant rockets has not been thoroughly understood, mainly
because of the very large number of parameters involved in the manufacture of solid
propellants. The parameters (Fig. 6) involve the ingredients (at least 10 different ingredients
are used, typically; see Table 1) and the processing (at least 30 steps have to be followed,
typically; see Fig. 7). The end-use parameters of interest include the steady-state (really,
"time-dependent") burn rate, susceptibility to instability or oscillatory combustion, ease of
ignition, uniformity of burn rate, completion of combustion (i.e., product distribution),
mechanical properties, aging characteristics, environmental effects, and a host of related
-issues.
The fact that no two batches of solid propellants are identical in performance has been
well recognized for many years; it has been thought adequate to maintain quality control
standards within, for example, JANNAF recommendations to meet specific needs.
Occasional "malfunctions" have not provided sufficiently strong stimuli for a detailed
scientific analysis of the problem. A significant shortcoming (12,000-foot altitude loss) in
the fourth launch of the STS in 1982 appears to have been the first problem to cause a
pink, if not red, flag to be raised 7 (Fig. 8). Subsequent revision of the SRB burn rate
downward (Fig. 9) appeared to have solved the problem, at least temporarily, s This incident
resulted in a thorough examination of the entire burn rate prediction procedures in large
SRBs. 9 The general conclusion appears to have been that more work is needed for a better
understanding of the mechanics of propellant manufacture, but it is simply not practical to
process, cast, cure, and test-fire hundreds of rockets, each containing literally millions of
pounds of propellants. Also, as the batch size increases, the potential for non-uniformities
in ingredient distribution and processing increases. Better techniques are needed not only to
ensure economy and quality control, but also to raise our confidence in the entire
manufacturing technique. We simply cannot wait for the "next" firing to provide one more
anomalous data point.
The understandable reticence of concerned manufacturers to openly discuss their
experiences with malfunctions has not helped to alleviate the problem [however, a good start
has been made by one company (see Fig. 10)]. The session organized by Bob Oeisler at the
AIAA Propulsion Meeting in 1982 appears to be the first to openly describe the
experiences. 2-6 No specific recommendations were made, however, to guide future efforts.
Two papers I°.!1 attempted to isolate one specific subprocess (final mixing time) for a
detailed analysis in a carefully controlled experiment where all other parameters were held
strictly constant. Use of the same lot numbers for the ingredients minimized ingredient
variations. The first theory attempted to relate the progressive grinding of the coarse AP to
burn rate and initial tensile modulus. The experimental results were consistent with theory.
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INGREDIENTS l PREPROCESSING
CAST and CURE STORE [ END USE
Fig. 6. Parameters involved in the manufacture of solid propellants.
Table 1. Ingredients for a typical propellant (EB--248).
Ingredient Lot No. Percentage Weight (g)
Butarez I-IT 4760 4.1452 658.050
R45M 7.6395 1212.771
Alrosperse 0.2180 34.6075
Iso Stearyl Alcohol 0.5473 86.8839
A0-2246 0.1400 22.2250
IPDI 1.3100 207.963
MT-4 0.200 31.7500
AI 1230 18.00 2857.50
AP, unground 5272 47.60 7556.50
AP, grind 8 20.40 3238.50
TOTAL 100.200
aNote that the actual numbers seemingly exceed 100% by weight.
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Depressed Launch Profile
Causes Concern Initially
Kennedy Space Center--Space shuttle's
fourth launch, on June 27, caused concern
among flight controllers when less-than-
planned solid rocket booster performance
created a depressed trajectory, lifting the
vehicle lower and slower than desired dur-
ing first-stage flight.
Columbia flew 8,000 ft. below its
planned trajectory line, costing a theoreti-
cal 2,000 lb. in payload, Johnson Space
Center engineers said.
The performance will be an issue for
future flights. Engineers are investigating
how booster performance is predicted pri-
or to liftolr.
The depressed trajectory did not falter
to the point where it seriously affected
flight safety. Flight controllers were con-
corned that it would become a serious
problem, but about "30 sec. into the lower
trajectory the shuttle began correcting
back toward the desired flight path.
Right controllers said that if they had
not seen a similar but smaller solid rocket
booster digression on Mission 3, the Flight
4 solid rocket performance would have
been even more of a real-time concern.
The performance resulted in delayed abort
mode calls to the crew and the separation
of the solid rocket boosters at a lower
altitude and at a slower velocity.
To compensate for the lower perform-
ance, the Rockctdync main engines
burned for 2-3 sec. longer than planned,
expending about 2,000 lb. worth of the
12,000 lb. of pa'yload performance margin
carried by the vehicle.
Maximum Trajectory
Even with the depressed flight path,
:aeronauts Navy Capt. Thomas K. Mat-
tingly and Henry W. Hart*field piloted
the Columbia through it* first maximum
performance ascent trajectory, verifying
the basic flight profile that will be
employed most often in the shuttle pro-
gram.
Mission 4 was the first to fly due east
out of Kennedy Space Center, Fla., into t
28.5 deE. orbital incline. It is at this Ingle
that the shuttle can benefit most from the
Earth's rotation when boosting payloads
into equatorial orbit. About 95% of shuttle
missions flown from Kennedy will follow
this profile.
Columbia's liftoff weight target of
4.484,585 lb. was about 5,000 lb. heavier
than Mission 3. The high.parformance
trajectory was selected for this flight to
assist vehicle propulsion with the heavier
mass. The Defense Dept. payload weighed
about 8,0043lb.
Immediately after liftoff from Launch
Pad 39A. Columbia rolled 90 dug. to the
right to establish a 090-dug. due east
AVI,IIIIQ_ W4mM a _pal_i T4lchll_k)Qy. J_ S. laa_,
heading over the Atlantic. This was a
departure from earlier missions when a
ll3-dag, or greater liftoff roll maneuver
was used to direct the orbiter northeast
into a higher 38-40.3 dog. orbital inclina-
tions.
Columbia's ascent profile was struc-
tured using both solid and main engine
performance data acquired on the first
three missions as opposed to the earlier
prooedurc of using analytical engine Ixr-
formance data. Flight directors expected
this to provide a more accuraie trajectory
compared with predicted values,
A desire to increase the dynamic pres-
stare envelope of the vehicle while at the
same time providing a softer ride in the
Math 0.8-1.2 maximum dynamic pressure
region, where additional data are needed,
also dictated changes between this and
previous launches.
Engineers achieved a higher dynamic
pressure than during the last flight at a
point later in the a._nt in order to reduce
the loads in the more critical Math 0.8-1.2
region. The maximum dynamic pressure
(Max-Q) for Mission 4 was targeted at
691 I_f. compared with 64g paf. on the last
flight and a maximum operational dynam-
ic pressure limit of 760 p*f.
Almost immediately after liftoff at t l
a. m., the vehicle began exhibiting charac-
teristics indicating lower-than-desired sol-
id motor performance. Main engine throt-
tle down to 65% to redLleeloadsat Max-Q
occurred 2-3 s_. late, and throttle up was
aloe delayed. During first-stage flight the
vehicle flies with open-loop guidance,
where attitude is a function of velooity.
The targeted throttle down from the i00%
point was at 13.5 sec.
Vehicle angle of attackat Math 1 was
programod flatter than on Mission 3 to
provide a more optimum performance for
the heavier ascent matt.
Mission 4 ascent flight test objectives
above Much 1 allowed for a higher
dynamic pressure in this regime. This was
a change that allowed a higher perform-
one.relative flight path angle in this
phase of the flight compared with the first
three missions.
At about I rain. into the astern, mission
control center plot* began showing a
marked digressinn from the nominal tra-
jectory line. This started controllers dis-
cussing the vehicle's energy state on the
ascent flight director's communication=
loop.
Booster Separation
The flatter programed trajectory for
Mission 4 had called for a solid booster
separation altitude 5,750 ft. lower than on
Mission 3. Actual solid motor perform-
ance On the flight, however, resulted in
depletion of propellant and booster separa-
tion about 2,000 ft. short of that goal at a
velocity of 4.293 fps. compared with the
4,336 f_. relative veloctty target.
The overall Mission 4 solid booster sep-
aration parameters were for a lower alti-
tude and a higher velocity separation in a
flatter climb trajectory to provide more
performance toward the 55-naut.-mi. main
engine cutoff target.
The less-than-expected solid motor per-
formancc, however, resulted in a lower
and slower situation than d_ired at this
point, affecting abort and other vehicle
energy milestones.
This became especially noticeable 2
rain. 40 sec, into the flight, when Colum-
bia was scheduled to be capable of achiev-
ing a Dakar, Senegui, emergency landing
with one engine failed. The milestone
paued with no notification of this capabil-
ity from spacecraft oommunioator astro-
naut David Griggs in Houston.
The two-engine Dakar capability ex-
pected at 2 rain. 40 sec. was not actually
attained until about 3 rain. i0 sec. Sulam-
quent energy oriented milestone= impor-
tant for abort mode determination were
delayed about i5 sec.
Throughout the remainder of powered
flight on the main engines, the closed loop
guidance phatu: that adjusts trajectory for
the most optimum profile to achieve main
engine cutoff target* took out the solid
motor performance deficiency. Main en-
gine cutoff was about 2-3 sec. later than
planned, but was achieved at the 25,677
fga. velocity predicted.
The 55 mi. engine cutoff point was
planned 3 mi. lower than on the last flight
and also programed to occur at a higher
vehicle flight path angle.
The ignition of the two Aerojct 6,000-
lb.-thrust orbital maneuvering system
(OMS) engines for the first OMS burn at
10 rain. 32 sec. into the flight was ob-
served through the Bermuda tracking sta-
tion.The I rain. 37.7 sec. burn provided a
154 f_. velocity change and an initial veh-
icle orbit of 130 x 33.3 naut. mi.
The second OMS burn was performed
37 rain. 40 rain. into the flight with the
175 fps. velocity change resulting in a [30
x [30 naut. mi. orbit completing tim
ascent.
Engineers believe more emphasis will be
placed on how the thrust from specific
solids can be clmractcrized prior to each
flight. []
Fig. 8. Article regarding deficiency in solid propellant performance. 7
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More important than the arithmetical accuracy of the results was the first recognition that
this complex problem may be amenable to scientific analysis after all. The point to note
here is that the importance of such work was recognized long before 1986. The letter from
Professor Summerfield (Appendix E) documents this.
A major step toward a scientific delineation of the quality assurance in solid rockets
was taken at MSFC via the report "Solid Propulsion Integrity Program Technical Plan"
(Preliminary Rept. No. 2-1635-7-14). Clear recognition was made of the fact that
in process management of particle size distribution, surface area and
concentration of critical ingredients such as iron oxide, aluminum oxide and
ammonium perchlorate should be developed, or.improved, Measurement of in
process viscosity is important and needs improvement. Process controls need
to be evaluated for the capability of providing control of the important
parameters wRhin the necessary limits as they become known. 12
A briefing to industry by Richard Brown 12.13 also has important details and future plans to
minimize surprises.
A program was established at JPL by Code M and MSFC to study these problems. As
part of that larger program, one low-level effort in 1984-85 indicated the importance of
actual temperatures as contrasted with global mixer jacket temperatures, for example.
Especially in a large mix, it was shown that the actual propellant temperature could not only
differ from the jacket temperature, but differ at different locations within the mix itself
(Fig. 11). A simple Arrehenius rate cure analysis indicated that increases of only one to
two degrees Fahrenheit in the mix temperature could result in a decrease of two to three
percent in the burn rate of the cured propellant. This simple quantitative estimate was
made in an unpublished interoffice memorandum at JPL in 1984. It is likely that one or
two degrees difference in the mean temperature could be indicative of five or more degrees
difference in local temperatures in the slurry, which could lead to significantly different
curing rates, especially if these differences occur after the addition of the curing agent (see
Fig. 12). A very careful entry was attempted of literally thousands of data points (mostly
from JPL data sources obtained in a nozzle evaluation rocket program) in an unfunded
study at the University of Arizona. This data base was generated on a PC by Hal Hikita.
At this point, it would be useful to recall two important aspects of solid propellant
predictability. First, the number of parameters is so large that a traditional scientific
formulation and analysis may be very difficult, even with the availability of large
computers. Second, the key processes that finally result in the cured propellant (and its
combustion) must be well understood in order to even look for meaningful trends. What
this means is that unconventional approaches may be necessary to obtain a good feel for the
variabilities and variations. In other words, we may have to make educated guesses about
the probable influences before subjecting the data to a more careful scrutiny.
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The author feels that it may be instructive to digress here and present two non-
technical examples from Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. In the first example, investigators are
attempting to reconstruct the events in the night that led to some unfortunate mishaps.
Sherlock Holmes guesses that a candle light may have been used in the night, looks for a
half-spent candle, and indeed finds it. If he had not looked for it, the candle would not
have been found because of all the mud and slush. In another example, he is faced with
extracting all" the information he can from a small note written hurriedly on the back of a
breakfast receipt at a hotel. While Lestrade is preoccupied with the contents of the note,
Sherlock Holmes is more fascinated by the very expensive breakfast; this leads him to the
hotel where the note was written. That is, what was merely "noise" to Lestrade was indeed
the "signal" to Holmes. In a field as complicated as solid propellants, unorthodox and
unconventional approaches are necessary to help introduce economical solutions. It is
emphasized that such unorthodox approaches should be used only to narrow down the field o/
our search and should not be used as substitutes for scientific and mathematical solutions.
End of digressionl
Correlations were attempted based on scientific criteria: in the absence of guiding
scientific analyses, attempts at obtaining correlations among these extensive sets of data
would have been both meaningless and futile. Two of the most important correlations were
seen between the end-of-mix viscosity and the burn rate (they are anti-correlated), Fig. 13,
and between the shore A hardness and the burn rate (Fig. 14). The significance of these
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was described elsewhere. 14 The mention of viscosity as a parameter does not mean that the
determination of viscosity is simple, or easy. Measurement (and interpretation) of viscosity
of a high solids slurry is by no means well understood. We find that in=situ measurements
(where possible), batch=interrupt measurements, and others give different values. The rate
of shear is very important. Recent results have also shown that the orifice diameter and
edge shape can influence the measured values. In a senior design project, two students
built a viscometer that gave continuous real=time viscosity in a mixer that used high-
viscosity fluids, simulating propeiiants. The apparatus was somewhat larger than what
could be conveniently included in a practical propellant mixer, but has provided a first step
in a highly desirable approach. The main point to note is that the important parameter,
namely slurry viscosity, does not appear to be measurable in an unambiguous way at the
present time.
More recently, five other plots were discovered to be significant in information
content. 15 In Figure 15, we see the non-uniformity of the oxidized particles in the slurry.
The composition near the blade is not the same as the bulk values. The basic message is
that important pieces of information are available on the manufacturing of propellants.
More are needed.
Long-Range and Short=Term Objectives
Development of a fundamental and scientific understanding of the complex processes
involved in solid propellant manufacture and end use (combustion in a rocket motor) will
need a commitment and should involve a well-coordinated nationwide effort among NASA,
DoD, industry, and the universities. Meaningful results that will prove their use in quality
assurance and predictability can be realistically expected in ten years after the initiation of
such an effort. The results will quantitatively relate the performance of a rocket motor (the
thrust time curve, for example) to the ingredients and processing variables; the program will
also evolve unambiguous a priori rules for effecting desired changes in propellant systems.
For example, one of the main results will be to evolve a table indicating the effect of
propellant (slurry) mix temperature and the end=use burn rate. Another example is the
prediction of the burn rate as a function of pressure as the curve is influenced by the
variance of the fine particle size distribution from the mean. Yet another example may be
the precise prediction of the burn rate when the shape of the coarse particles is specified as
a deviation from spheres.
In a field that is as important and current as solid rockets, it would be appropriate to
demand more immediate results. Recent work 14 has clearly indicated the definite promise
of such results. For example, it was shown that the final mixing time has a measurable
- 19-
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effect upon the burn rate and the Young's modulus of the cured propellant. It was also
shown that the end-of-mix (EoM) viscosity is a definite indicator of the burn rate variation
of the cured propellant. Such quantitative observations are significant. For example, the
processing could carefully monitor the slurry viscosity continuously, and when the viscosity
deviates beyond a specified bound, corrective actions would be initiated. This would avoid
the costly waste of the production of a full-scale motor of substandard, or unacceptable,
quality. To some extent, such observations are indeed in use at the present time. The
author admired the judgment of Joe Hance (who, incidentally, directed the processing and
production of the T-17 propellant that was successfully used in Explorer I), who would
make a decision to stop the processing of propellants based merely on observation of the
"quality" of the slurry; the explanation would usually be something like, "the LP-3 had
probably deteriorated during storage." This admiration invariably turned quicky into
frustration upon realizing that solid propellant quality assurance was not scientifically
prescribed, but depended instead on the feel of experience. In the short-term, a program,
such as the one discussed in this report, would evolve quantitative, if semi-empirical, rules
that will be useful in processing. The qualitative feel of experience will be made
scientifically respectable and technologically acceptable through independent verifications.
The point is that the benefits of a fundamental program will be felt immediately. These
short-term objectives will be to provide, clear, dependable guidelines for economical
processing and a list of measurable parameters that give a tell-tale signal of the health of the
propellant.
The Legacy of Black Art
Solid propellants have also suffered from their legacy of black art. Many of their
manufacturing techniques cannot be traced to scientific evolution. The detailed batch sheets
and SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) are usually the result of experience. It would be
most useful to revisit some of these.
Solids Versus Liquids
There appears to be a growing feeling among many concerned 16 that eliminating solid
rockets altogether, in favor of liquids, would completely "solve" all problems. The absence
of a Challenger-class (liquid rocket) catastrophic failure 17 belies the extreme vulnerability of
liquid rocket motors. It would be wise to recall that there have been a number of near
misses with liquid rockets in recent years. The major problems are systematically outlined
by Feynman: 18
• Turbine blade cracks in high-pressure fuel turbopumps (HPFTP). [May have been
solved.]
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• Turbine blade cracks in. high-pressure oxygen turbopumps (HPOTP).
• Augmented spark igniter (ASI) line rupture.
• Purge check valve failure.
• ASI chamber erosion.
• HPFTP turbine sheet metal cracking.
• HPFTP coolant linear failure.
• Main combustion chamber outlet elbow failure.
• Main combustion chamber inlet elbow weld offset.
• HPOTP subsynchronous whirl.
• Flight acceleration safety cutoff system. [Partial failure in a redundant system.]
• Bearing spelling. [Partially solved.]
• A vibration at 4,000 Hertz making some engines inoperable, etc.
There have also been major catastrophic failures, involving key components, in static tests.
The dramatic explosion of Ariane Spot l's third stage provides a flight example in recent
times (November 1986). Another seriotis problem with liquid propellant rockets is beginning
to be recognized lately. This is the potential for orbital debris creation. While the exact
cause is not yet known, many believe that a debris hit caused the Ariane third-stage
explosion in 1986 (Fig. 16): nOfficials believe the most likely cause of the explosion
was the detonation of residual oxygen/hydrogen propellants in the vehicle". 19 This
"Ariane Spot 1 rocket body represents the single greatest source of debris now in orbit
about the earth. "2° The pressure-fed systems used in liquid rockets are a source "of
catastrophic explosions upon impact. Many other problems include leaks, toxicity hazards in
the vacuum of space, and extreme low temperatures in the vicinity of cryogenic tanks;
many serious problems in several operational spacecraft have indeed been traced to these
sources. Mechanically, liquid rockets are far more complex than solid rockets--a fact that
has frequently forced long dealys in launches due .to last-minute repairs. At the
fundamental level, the combustion processes of the liquids (providing thrust) are no better
understood than those of solids. It would be prudent to keep all options alive at this time,
and for the foreseeable future, unless a major advance is made in liquid rocket reliability
and safety. After all, it is its intrinsic simplicity that has made the solid rocket so attractive
for centuries. This simplicity allows for a great flexibility in the size of the motor at little
cost. A well-proved solid propellant can be loaded into motors of any size. In extreme
cases, a piece of propellant from a larger motor can be cut, loaded into, and used in a
smaller motor. Such flexibility is totally absent in liquids, which still need the full system
of components in the smaller motor.
We cannot give up the proven merits of the solid motor simply because some problems
remain unsolved; in fact, the merits provide a strong motivation for scientifically solving
these few remaining problems.
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Used Ariane Stage Explodes,
Creating SpaceDebris Hazard
i
Wuhim_oe_-A European Ariane bcemer
third stage launched nine months ago ex-
pIocled in srmce _ crealing I',oten-
daily hazardous orbiting debris and
prompting s U.S. request that Arim_--
space investigate the incident to prevent a
recurrence.
The Argue i stagehad beenusedFeb.
22 to launch the French Spot I Emlh
r¢emurces _tellite (^w_s'r Mar. 3, p. 21).
The explosion could result in changes
to avoid such incidents and limit the
buildup of,debris orbiting Earth, accord-
ing to Frederic d'Allest, president of
A rianespec¢
The expicmoq of the spent stap is nm
believed to be linked to problems experi-
enced in the oxygen/hydrogen system
doting powered flight. The Arlene third
stgp has i'ailed ahme times, meet recently
on May 30 (^wise June 9, p. 21).
, Before the explm_on, the White Home,
State Dept. and National Aex_nauticz and
Space Administration had belpm an d'ort
to alert international si_tee aBendes to the
dsbds Jss_.
The Ariane stage was orbiting in about
a 490-mi. Sun-syra_ polar orbit in-
dined 98.'/ deg. when it exploded. The
lores of the ,expJceioa threw debris into
orbits us low us 270 mi. and u high as
840 mi.
The incident occurred at 7:39 p.m.
OMT Nov. 13 justaRer the Ariane stap
premed the equator em a northbound path
ovq¢ the oenmd AUanti¢ between South
America and Afdc=.
Gmmd Tradd_
U.S. Air Force Spece Command aed
Navy Sp_ce Surveillance System radars
are trscidn| about 200 pieces of clebri
one-half inch in diameter or larger. This
sullllests the presence of several hundred
or thousands, o( groggier particles impom_
Me to truck with ground-_ radars.
Even a smaJl particle orbiting at high ve-
locity could'cripple or destroy a space-
cruft--mlnned or untanned---were a
collision to occur.
Of Kcials believe the mere I_ely cause of
the ex_ wus the detonation of" resid-
ual oxyWhydrogen propellants in the
vebicJe. Space Command conducted com-
pute_r mudy,Jes to determine whether the
breakup was catmed by collision with
other sTmce debris. Radar data, however,
show no other trackable debris in the
arl_. i
Srmce Command analysts heli_ve that
other AtOne third staiP_s launched into
gemynchmcmus orbit may have exploded
alter long exposure in space. Evidence
con_-I fn'_m trncking apTmrem debris from
these vehk:lelk aJthough such fragments
ate extremely hard to trick since they
orbit above the equator, where the U, 5.
has minimal nu_r capability. The Spo( i
stale was (lying in •n orbit where trackin|
is far es.-.ier.
Although the odds of collision with •
usei'ui satellite are smlJi, many speceorgf_
hlwe orbits thst pus Ih.rnogh the 8tea in
which the Ar/nne debris he.q dispersed.
There also is significant debris in this
are8 from seven U.S. Ddta second nurses
that exploded years ago after proiongecl
exposure to the space environment The
Delta incidents created a continuing space
debris problem and subsequent Delta
sAaBes have been modilk_d to pR,vent'po-
tenUIdly explosive conditions from bui]d-
inlb I-I
_1 4VllOVgd IMa'/Ig_l(_##O_Clnt_ 1. IIIII
Fig. 16. Article on creation of space debris. 19
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Some Simple Approaches
Composite solid propellant predictability and quality assurance can only come through
adequate control of the ingredients and processing. As was evident throughout this meeting,
and other information sources, we are beginning to identify some of the more important
parameters that one must control and for which specifications must be established. After
such specifications are proposed, they must still go through a series of independent
verifications, different scales of mixers, different sizes of motors, and different firing
conditions before they can be well received, accepted, and followed. In the meantime, some
of the more straightforward procedures that the author has followed are described here.
1. Simple Physical and Chemical Examination of the Oxidizer.--Very simple
SEM/EDAX examinations of the AP, as received, can be quite revealing. Shown in Figs. 17
and 18 are AP crystals from two sources; Fig. 17 shows AP from a source in the USA,
while Fig.18 shows AP from a Japanese source (Nahun Kaleet). The differences are
dramatic. Not only are the Japanese AP much more spherical, but their sizes are far more
uniform; the particle size seems to approach a unimodal distribution. Prilling produced the
near spherical AP in Fig. 18. The precise quantitative influences of this difference in
shape on the processing, cast, cure, and combustion are not clear. It would seem obvious
that there will be substantial differences. While this example is intentionally chosen here to
make a point, the utility of simple SEM examination of as-received AP should be obvious,
even when the shape differences are not this dramatic. /It is most interesting that nearly
three months after these shape influences were discussed at this meeting, a paper discussing
very similar concerns and data was presented at the AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE 25th Joint
Propulsion Conference, Monterey California, July 10-12, 1989. 21]
2. Simple SEM Examinations of the Cast _Cut) Propellant.--Scanning electron
microscopy has been extensively used in the diagnostics of quenched samples from
combustion experiments; the pioneering work at NOTS/NWC is most familiar to those in the
field of composite propellants. However, the use of SEM for simpler examination of cured
propellants is not that prevelant. In one of the programs on low-smoke, high-burn-rate AP
propellants, some candidate propellants exhibited unacceptably poor reproducibility (Fig. 19).
Pressed for time, we attempted a simple SEM examination of the cured propellants. In Fig.
20, the propellant looks fairly good in terms of mixing, voids, and the coarse/fine
distribution; this was indeed the propellant that burned reproducibly. In Fig. 21, we see a
very different pattern. The propellant does not appear to have mixed well, voids are
present, and the coarse/fine distribution does not appear to be uniform. This was indeed a
- 24 -
Fig. 17. AP crystals obtained from a source in the United States.
Fig. 18. AP crystals obtained from a source in Japan.
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propellant that burned in a non-reproducible manner. While these SEM examinations do not
solve the problem, they can economically reveal the problem source.
3. Complete Examination of the Particle Size Distribution.--Many ingredients in
composite propellants are particles. Examples include coarse AP, fine AP, and aluminum.
These particle sizes were designated by the commercially convenient 50% weight average
point. This is wholly inadequate for our purposes. Different distributions can have
identical 50% weight average points. Shown in Fig. 22 are two such distributions. Their
influence on combustion was acutely felt in one program. A solid rocket motor was
developed with the" first grind and was stable within the pressure range of interest in a
double BATES motor. Having exhausted our supply of fine AP, we borrowed some AP of
the "same size" from a nearby laboratory to complete the motor tests. The new batch of
motors went unstable in firing tests. As is evident in Fig. 22, the second AP had a
narrower distribution, with the 100% weight average point at 20 microns, as contrasted with
40 microns for the first AP. A simple computation of natural propellant frequency (mean
burn rate divided by the 100% weight average point of fine AP) shows that the frequencies
for the two propellants are substantially different. In the first case, the frequency was not
close to any of the natural acoustic frequencies of the rocket motor cavity; in the second
case, it was. This example from 1973 may seem a little archaic. Today, more complete
particle size analyses are indeed routine. Nevertheless, this experience is typical of many
other ingredient characterizations that are inadequate to ensure quality and reproducibility
in solid rockets.
- 27 -
Fig. 20. A propellant whose burn could be reproduced.
Fig. 21. A propellant that burned in a non-reproducible manner.
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